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The Economy of the Soviet Union 
 The Soviet economy and how it operated successfully to make it one of the world 
superpowers in the world under the socialist regime still is unclear to many people around the 
world, and especially those outside the vast territories of Soviet influence.  The country of 
Ukraine was one of those countries, which makes it very important to understand why the country 
is at the position it presently finds itself in. Thus, to help us better understand the Ukrainian 
economy we will look into the history of the Soviet Union.  
Birth of the Soviet Economy 
 Following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Joseph Stalin introduced the concept of a 
having planned economy in 1928 where the state was to control the amount of output produced, 
mainly given by the orders of the one of the world’s frightful dictators in the history of human 
kind and especially the history of the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union lacked a good system 
of replacing its political leaders. As a matter of fact, the Soviet economy was most fruitful during 
the time of Stalin. However, following his death, Stalin’s predecessors were evidently much 
kinder to the citizens, which reflected their time of order as being more relaxed one than the 
chilly Stalin era. This was an important in the history of the Soviet Union played a major role in 
the future of the Soviet Union economy.  
 While the majority of economies nowadays are mixed economies that involve both state 
and private involvement, the Soviet one was plainly state controlled economy. It was very 
complicated hierarchical system that required much coordination and obligations on the part of 
the public. At the top of the food chain was the party power, followed by sector ministries at the 
intermediate level and at the lower level were the state owned enterprises. Those were mainly 
national industrial and agrarian organizations that took orders from their higher up political 
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leaders and parties. The planning and the resource allocation that the enterprises took were 
decided by the state itself and under the direction of the parties, or more precisely by the Gosplan 
(State Planning Commission), which sent five-year plans to the ministries. The ministries then 
broke down the total output required and delegated orders to various state enterprises with 
production quotas.  The Gosbank (national bank) was kept into secret for a long time. It was 
responsible for the distribution of money, which it estimated based on the requirements of the 
economy (2). In the absence of interest rates, any capital investments in various enterprises were 
decided by the national bank that controlled the entire money supply. Prices were based on the 
cost of inputs and desired markups and taxes, as opposed to the actual demand and supply of 
goods and services. Therefore, the money supply played a very minor role in the economy, which 
will later prove to have fatal effects in the transition to a market orientated economy, which we 
will discuss later in the paper. Early in the 1980s, the majority of the people occupying the Soviet 
Union and its political leaders sensed the pressure and stagnation of the economy. According to 
official and non-official Soviet reports as well as CIA estimates, the GDP growth has fallen from 
6-8% in 1950s to 2-4% in 1980s (14). Eventually, Gorbachov tried to revive through national 
reform known as the perestroika. While the Gorbachov’s plans of opening up the economy to 
international trade (dramatic change from Stalin’s time), the country (along with its policies) has 
been isolated from the world for such a long period of time that it was very difficult for it to set 
effective joint projects with foreign businesses. In addition, the array legislative acts that 
Gorbachov were usually too complicated and difficult to carry out (2).  
 Strengths of the Soviet Economy 
 One of the significant strengths of the Soviet economy was its commitment to research 
and development in scientific industries, which lead to many inventions and achievements. This 
can be best reflected by the revolutionary achievements, in the space (launch of Sputnik), military 
2 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States Handbook: p3-12 
14 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States Handbook: p28-35 
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(Red Scare) and industrial sectors.  Furthermore, many benefits were provided to the public that 
included free medical care, education, good transportation system and decent national 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the size of population and abundant national resources played a key 
role in the countries gross domestic output. Nevertheless, there were many flaws in the system 
that would lead the economy to collapse.  
   Limitations of the Soviet Economy 
 Despite that in theory the output of the economy was planned, this was primarily true and 
effective for some essential consumer products. Since the government controlled the capital 
allocations, most of the time heavy industry projects were favored as opposed to developments in 
the light industry. This was later a major challenge in the transition process to market economy as 
most government institutions had policies and infrastructure suitable for the mass production 
orientated farming and heavy industrial sectors. Investments in the military sector were top 
priority for the Soviet Union in its military race with the United States during the Cold War. On 
the other hand, the availability and variety of some special consumer products was downplayed 
and shortages often occurred due to inadequate state orders and investments. Thus, many 
households accumulated cash that they could not spend for products and invest back in the 
economy, limiting the multiplier effect growth on the national economy. 
 The foreign trade (outside Soviet Union) was almost inexistent as the state currency 
(ruble) was not convertible to other currencies. Consequently, the leadership of the Soviet Union 
effectively isolated the its territory from taking advantage of foreign trade and prevented for the 
most of time trade with countries that had comparative or absolute advantage in the production of 
some products.  
 One of the major difficulties was giving precise production orders that were to satisfy the 
needs of citizens the gigantic area of the Soviet Union. Some factories were given orders that they 
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lacked input materials to produce while other factories in distant locations had huge surpluses of 
similar inputs. At the same time there was not an effective system in place to relocate and adjust 
shortage and surpluses of resources among enterprises. Enterprises in similar fields of production 
did not have good communication networks among each other. The primary demands of the state 
were to produce the desired output and there were not incentives or punishments for the level of 
quality of products. There were minimal standards that had to me met, which were regularly 
disregarded by top management, because of lack of supervision from the state ministries. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States 
 In December 1991, the Soviet Union was divided into the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) that was initially founded by Ukraine, Russia and Belarus.  In a short amount of 
time, they were joined by nine other former Soviet states that included Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Georgia. The 12 
states host about 300 million people and cover about 16.3% of the world’s land area. Their 
industrial potential is about 10% of the world’s total and they possess approximately 25% of all 
natural resources.  The CIS is the world’s fourth largest producer of electrical energy and the 
structure of intellectual property rights of the CIS is estimated to be worth US$500 billion (14). 
CIS is an international institution that was created to provide a forum for the officially states to 
work to cooperate with each other in reviving their economic and political structures towards 
democratic market economies. All of the countries shared many similarities inherited from the 
Soviet Union that included: 
• A common language (Russian). 
• A common currency (ruble) 
• Close economic relationships among enterprises 
• Almost identical public infrastructures  
14 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p28-35 
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• Shared standards (legal, medical, and education systems) 
• Similar ethnic groups (Slavic) 
  All of the similarities above actually made the new states extremely dependent on each 
other. For example, Ukraine received 56% of its gas supplies from Russia and other states such 
as Belarus and Moldova were totally dependent on Russia for energy resources. The CIS has 
not been very successful mainly due to the disagreements on common policies and imbalances 
of power in the organization. Russia has dominated politically and economically not only the 
policies of the CIS itself, but the policies of many states (14). Furthermore, the CIS states 
failed for the most part to include adequate investments in replacing obsolescent assets and 
introducing new technologies. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, the three largest CIS states (Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan – generated 83% of CIS 
GDP), in 1997 invested less than 20% of their investment levels during 1990 (20).  
Ukraine on Crossroad 
 Ukraine has been on a crossroad in many of its decision makings on a pathway with two 
diverging pathways. Many factors such as the country’s location, history, long-term partnerships 
and shared language all contribute to a unique relationship with the Russian state. The 
relationship and many economic, political, and cultural similarities between Russia and Ukraine 
can be easily compared to the ones of the United States and Canada. For example, Nikolai 
Travnik of the Russian Democratic Party mentioned that “history requires that Russia’s relations 
with Ukraine be qualitatively different from its relations with other foreign countries”(17). 
Moreover, surveys in 1994 found that 78% of the Russian respondents stated that Ukraine should 
become part of Russia. On the other hand, similar polls in Ukraine suggested that 36% agreed that 
there should be some kind of union between the two states. While the countries are dependent of 
each other they had several disputes such as the ownership of nuclear weapons that were left 
14 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p28-35  
17 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p77 
20 Kaser, Michael. Finance and Development. 
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behind on Ukrainian territory, the Black Sea Fleet from the Soviet Union, the repayment of debts 
to Russia (27).  
 Today, not many people will argue that the choice has been made to take the road 
towards the West that is especially evident in the presidential leadership. However, survey results 
show that this is not necessarily true among the Ukrainian population, which seems to have 
diverging views that are usually reflected in regional votes. Western Ukraine is more pro-
democratic while Eastern Ukraine is more aligned with the national connection with Moscow. For 
example, in the 1998 election results by region 15.5% of the West (composed of 8 regions 
according to the survey) voted for Communist parties. On the other hand, 44.4% of Eastern 
Ukraine (6 regions) voted in the same category and 6.7% voted for the National Democrats (26). 
Political System 
 Before we move into the economic conditions and foreign direct investment statistics of 
the Ukrainian economy, it is crucial to understand the political environment that happens to play 
an important role in the Ukrainian economy. First of all we will cover the governmental structure 
developments after the country’s independence, the set up of the political system and it division 
of power, and lastly the US diplomatic relations with Ukraine. 
Post-Soviet Government System Developments 
 Following a number of disagreements among the interests and control of Soviet Russia 
over the state of Ukraine, the country reached its independence from the Soviet Union on August 
24, 1991 (3). In June 28th, 1996, the Ukrainian parliament, also known as Verkhovna Rada, 
passed a new Constitution. As opposed to the values of the socialist era, the constitution itself 
promised and followed in its structure many of the core values exhibited in the western market 
economies. For example, the new Constitution provided the right to private ownership of land and 
3 Central Intelligence Agency Website 
26 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p84: table 6.7. 
27 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p69-79 
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assets, stronger and clearer law structure and more independent judiciary system. All these factors 
are key government structure elements that foreign investors look for prior to any investment 
considerations. Despite the promising configuration of the political system, many of the 
principles have not been yet fully implemented by the legislative branch of government. The 
reasons for the lack of enforcement are mainly due to the current political dominating forces and 
the division of power among the branches of government in Ukraine (4).  
Structure of Political System 
 Before, we cover the recent division of power in the political system, it is important that 
we explain the structure of the political system itself. The government system is composed of 
executive, legislative and judicial branches.  
 The executive branch has been headed by the chief of state, President Leonid D. Kuchma, 
since 1994 and the cabinet of ministers that are appointed by the President and approved by the 
Supreme Council. President Kuchma has been supporting a pro-market economy and a 
democratic orientated political system. Although his ideology has been in tact of the one of the 
western world, breaking developments and findings after his 2nd term presidential elections in 
2000 significantly questioned and dropped his credibility among both the legislative branch and 
the foreign political leaders and investors. An insider of his cabinet provided audio tapes in front 
of the media and the public that had included his orders to murder a journalist during the 
presidential elections. However, the voice recorded on the tapes was not clear and evident enough 
to directly link the president to this murder case leaving the case in mystery still nowadays.   
 The legislative branch is represented by a unicameral parliament composing of 450 seats 
that are divided in two halves in terms of their election. The first half (225 seats) is distributed 
among the political parties represented on the basis of their proportion of vote earned in the 
national electoral vote. The other 225 seats are fulfilled by the popular vote represented by 
4 Ukraine Country Commercial Guide FY 2002: Chapter 3: Political Environment, Point B 
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individuals of the geographic regions of Ukraine.  The political parties in Ukraine are not very 
well developed as the majority of them tend to be focused on personal interests and represent 
specific group of individuals that act for the benefit of their own group. In other words, corruption 
is evident among many individuals of the parliament.  
 
 
 
 This has been an issue in their effectiveness to enforce Ukraine’s Constitution, since they 
have been missing in their actions the commonwealth ideology of transforming the country to an 
independent market economy through democratic means of action. Therefore, the legislative 
system has failed to pass and implement laws that will most effectively support the guidelines of 
the country’s novel and promising Constitution. The majority of the legislators and other political 
leaders agree in broad terms that in order for the country to move on in positive direction 
significant foreign investments are needed. Nevertheless, the legislators have had hard time so far 
to implement the necessarily favorable laws and business regulatory system that may attract 
significant number of foreign investors in the country.  
 The last branch of government is the judicial branch, which seems to have not been very 
active due to the lack of major Constitution orientated laws imposed by the legislative branch (6). 
Now that we have discussed the Ukrainian political system, we can move to further investigate 
the balance of power among and within some of the branches of government. 
Current Political Division of Power 
 The parliamentary elections take place every 4 years, while the presidential elections take 
place every 5 years. As it can be witnessed from the graph below, in the 1998 election polls it can 
be seen that the Communist Party of Ukraine have earned a significant number of votes that has 
given it more than 2 and half times more seats (87 mandates) in the parliament compared to the 
next ranking party (7).  
 
 
 6 Ukraine Country Commercial Guide FY 2002: Chapter 3: Political Environment, Point C 
 7 Central Elections Commission Website: March 29, 1998 
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№ Party (Bloc) 
Votes cast 
"For" in 
Ukraine 
%  Graph Man-dates 
1 Communist Party of Ukraine 6 550 353 24.65 84 
2 People's' Movement of Ukraine 2 498 262 9.40  32 
3 Bloc of the Socialist Party and Peasant Party 2 273 788 8.55  29 
4 The Green Party of Ukraine 1 444 264 5.43  19 
5 People's-democratic Party 1 331 460 5.01  17 
6 All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada" 1 242 235 4.67  16 
7 Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine 1 075 118 4.04  14 
8 Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) 1 066 113 4.01  14 
9 Agrarian Party of Ukraine 978 330 3.68   
10 "Reforms and Order" Party 832 574 3.13   
Some of the top goals on the communist agenda include deliberate and intensified 
cooperation with Russia and Belarus, increase in the state involvement and control over the 
country’s infrastructure and industry, and expansion of broad social programs for the Ukrainian 
citizens. The rest of the socialist based parties that had still received a significant combined 
number of seats (see graph above) follow some of the core values of the communist party, but 
have different vision of implementing the goals. However, the majority of the goals are 
contradictory and unattractive to many western foreign investors who are not experienced, 
comfortable or ready to prosper in such a political environment.  
 After all, there have been major changes in the balance of power from the 1998 elections 
compared to the most recent elections that have taken recently taken place earlier this year 
(2002). From the graph below, one can see that there has been shift of power from the communist 
party towards the newly introduced party named “Our Ukraine” as well few other new based 
parties that still have a lot of expectations and promises to meet of the Ukrainian people (8). It 
will be very important how that shift in the balance of power will be translated in legislative 
terms and constitutional enforcement in the near future that many foreign investors will look for. 
 
 
8 Central Elections Commission Website: March 31, 2002 
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№ Party (Bloc) 
Votes cast 
"For" in 
Ukraine 
%  Graph Man-dates 
1 
Election bloc of Political Parties "Victor Yushchenko 
Bloc "Our Ukraine" 6 108 088 23.57 70 
2 Communist Party of Ukraine 5 178 074 19.98  59 
3 Election bloc of Political Parties "For One Ukraine!" 3 051 056 11.77  35 
4 
Election bloc of Political Parties "Juliya Tymoshenko 
election bloc" 1 882 087 7.26  22 
5 Socialist Party of Ukraine 1 780 642 6.87  20 
6 Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) 1 626 721 6.27  19 
7 Election bloc of Political Parties "Nataliya Vitrenko Bloc" 836 198 3.22   
8 "Womans for the Future" All-Ukrainian Political Union 547 916 2.11   
9 Election bloc of Political Parties "Team of Winter Generation" 525 025 2.02   
10 Communist Party of Ukraine (renew) 362 712 1.39   
Political Relations between the USA and Ukraine 
5 Ukraine Country Commercial Guide FY 2002: Chapter 3: Political Environment, Point A 
 
 
 After the extensive Cold War that US had against the socialist values of Soviet Union, it 
has been in the US interest to strongly support independent pro-democratic and capitalist 
orientated Ukrainian state. Therefore, the US and Ukraine began to closely cooperate between 
each other in 1993, after Ukraine reached independence, to strengthen their economic 
relationships. As matter of fact, in 1994, the US committed one of the largest American aid 
programs in the world at that time to Ukraine. Those funds were directed for the elimination of 
nuclear weapons and infrastructure as well as for building stronger and market orientated export 
system. Moreover, in 1996 the so called Gore-Kuchma Binational Commission was created to 
improve the mutual relationship and efforts of reviewing and developing the commercial, 
economic and military systems of Ukraine. However, President’s Bush administration in 2001 
decided to cancel out the commission set between the countries as it was not one of the top 
priorities of the US at that time. Nevertheless, both the US and Ukraine have agreed to continue 
dialogue and cooperate among each other in three main areas of  international trade, investment 
and economic reform, law enforcement, and foreign policy and defense structure (5). Ukraine has 
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received more foreign aid from the United States than any other country except Israel and Egypt 
(17).  
Economic Conditions 
 Before we move into analyzing some of the key domestic economic factors, the country’s 
infrastructure and its levels of international trade, it is important to get familiar with some of the 
general facts and standards of the country itself. The general summary of the country usually 
explains the rationale among foreign and domestic investors for doing business in Ukraine who in 
turn affect the balance of trade and the economic performance of the country. 
General Overview 
Ukraine has approximately a population of just over 48 million people and in terms of its 
land it is the second largest country in Europe, after Russia. Located in Eastern Europe, Ukraine 
is in a strategic position often used as the crossroad between European and Asian markets. The 
ethnicity of Ukraine is about 73% Ukrainian, 22% Russian, 1% Jewish, and others. Ukrainian is 
the official language and Russian is also widely used, but very closely associated to Ukrainian as 
Slavic language. The other few languages used are Romanian, Polish, Hungarian and English, 
which is emerging among the youth population. The Ukrainian highly educated (98% literacy 
rate) and large population, immense natural resources, strategic position in Europe, and its 
emergence as a new independent democratic state from the Soviet influence has brought about 
high expectations and hope of economic growth among foreign investors, political leaders, and 
the Ukrainian citizens (3). Nevertheless, the results of those expectations will be best reflected in 
the country’s macroeconomic record that we will closely look at in the next few sections of the 
paper.  
 
3 Central Intelligence Agency Website 
17 Heenan, and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p77 
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Domestic Economy 
The Transition Period: The 1993 Economic Crisis 
 The previous Soviet influence over the region of Ukraine has set strong economic bonds 
and interdependence between today’s independent states of Russia and Ukraine. As a matter of 
fact, following Russia, Ukraine’s domestic output is about four times the size of the next ranking 
country of the Commonwealth Independent States. Ukraine is known for its abundant rich 
agricultural industry, natural resources, and its national defense infrastructure inherited from the 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, after the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
the country’s defense system has been maintained poorly and it is in degrading condition (9). 
 Ineffective Post-Soviet Economic Reform 
After 1991, analytical studies of experts predicted that Ukraine will be the fastest 
growing economy of all the new independent states after Soviet’s break-up (11). Despite that 
90% of those voting in 1991 supported the country’s independence; the country was to be faced 
with much more political and economic obstacles in the near future. The Ukrainian republic has 
disappointed the expectations of many people for a long period of time following its 
independence. The trust of Ukrainian citizenry in the political leaders was demolishing while ties 
with the Russian government still remained strong. The new government officials were 
incompetent to operate in the new uncertain government and economic framework that the 
country’s independence has given to its new emerging political leaders. Despite that the 
Ukrainian government set its new born agenda to follow market economy orientated leadership, it 
failed to set attractive and strong legal framework in the privatization of its state assets.    
 Hyperinflation 
The inflation was most evident in the transition period of the country. In the early 1990s, 
the Ukrainian privatization was very weak, if existent, and the use of its capital infrastructure led 
9 Ukraine Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, Chapter 2: Economic Trends and Outlook 
11 Yastreb, Andriy. Personal Interview 
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to a steep decline in domestic output. The output in 1999 had collapsed to less than 40% of its 
level in 1991. On the other hand, Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for energy supplies and the 
significant hike in the energy price directed the country to a forceful deficit in its balance of trade, 
since the value of imports increased following the increase in prices of imports. The political 
parties’ indecisiveness and lack of clear economic reform agenda left the government with a loose 
monetary policy that was later reflected in a significant hyperinflation in 1993. For example, the 
government printed without much limits more money and used them to provide numerous loans 
to revive the old state enterprises. In addition, not until 1996, the government formed its own 
currency, the Ukrainian hryvna. Therefore, during the transition period it used the Russian ruble 
that did not isolated the country from inflationary effects transferred from countries in the region. 
All those led to a significant increase in the money supply that was followed by a hyperinflation. 
In 1992, consumer prices in Russia raised sixteen fold and producer prices raised twenty fold. 
Consequently in 1993, consumer prices in CIS increased by 875% in Russia and record setting 
4,735% in Ukraine (20). The inflation ruined the bank accounts of the consumers and later led to 
vast bankruptcies among the banks, because they were not able to repay the money demanded by 
the terrified consumers who stormed into banks to demand the worthless Ukrainian currency that 
they had been saving (9). 
 Lifestyle during the Transition Period 
 The inflation had tremendous negative effects on the lifestyle of many Ukrainian citizens. 
Real wages in May 1997 were worth only 26% of the wages during their 1991 levels. This 
illustrates the magnitude of erosion of the purchasing power of the consumer. Furthermore, 
during many times the government institutions had several shortages of their budgets delaying the 
salary payments to the workers. Below are two quotes of Ukrainian teachers who participated in a 
teacher training forum organized by the National Council on Economic Education. The 
 9 Ukraine Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, Chapter 2: Economic Trends and Outlook 
19 Lopus, Jane. The Social Studies. 
20 Kaser, Michael. Finance and Development. 
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statements below truly exemplify the difficulties that the average state worker had to struggle 
with during inflationary period (19).  
 Natalia T., from Lviv, Ukraine: The elderly people are in a critical condition. The 
 savings of my parents and their friends have devalued. [In Soviet times], my parents 
 deposited 6,000 rubles into a savings bank, which would have bought a car or 
 furniture at that time. My mom trusted the government. Today this money has gone to 
 the wind. It will buy nothing. It doesn't exist.  
 Galina V., from Odessa, Ukraine: I live with skyrocketing inflation. My real 
 standard of living is low. The buying power of my salary has decreased  considerably 
 since independence. To survive, I am forced to combine several  jobs. I have very little 
 spare time. Before independence, the rent for my apartment was very low, and now it is 
 very high. Now I have to pay a large percentage of my salary for rent, food, 
 transportation - everyday things. I can't afford long-term purchases like a TV or a 
 refrigerator.  
 Iren Bozilov who was a college student in Kharkiv revealed that during the 
economic crisis public universities gave coupons instead of cash to college students that 
worked on campus. Those were used to buy various essential food products from store, 
because otherwise in a matter of no time their earnings would have evaporated (1). 
Nevertheless, things were to be changed for better after a new pro-reform administration 
was elected following the 1993 economic catastrophe. There were a significant number 
of new freedoms that many people received that were not evident during other. Below 
are two excerpts commenting on the positive civil liberties gained during the transition 
period (19). 
 Olexander B., from Lutsk, Ukraine: What I appreciate most in this period of transition is 
 an access to information. When we lived behind the Iron Curtain, it was next to 
 impossible to get access to the authors who were needed to me as a teacher. . . and 
 to read about what was  happening outside the former Soviet Union. I'm very happy that 
 now, finally, I can read  what I want to read, I can talk to the people I want to talk to, I 
 can see what I want to see, and I can go wherever I want to go. 
1 Bozilov, Iren. Personal Interview.  
19 Lopus, Jane. Life in the transition economies. The Social Studies. 
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 Yuri V., from Lviv, Ukraine: The possibilities of making choices have expanded. 
 I can choose my sphere of work and my place in society. This was inconceivable  under 
 the planned economy.  
 Public Dissatisfaction and Mistrust 
 The majority of the Ukrainian public did not have much trust its legislature and political 
system as a whole during the transition period. For the period of 1994-1997, the public trust in 
astrologers was higher than the legislature and the some main political parties (The Rukh, 
Communists, and Nationalists). In 1993, 12% of public respondents in Central and Eastern Euro 
barometer surveys reported satisfaction with the overall performance of the country. In 1996, the 
response rate in the same category has slightly improved to 17.4%. Moreover, in 1993, only 14.85 
of the public reported satisfaction with democracy and 11% expressed hope in the future. Only 
4.4% reported improvement in the family household finances (21). All of the statistics above 
clearly show the strong dissatisfaction and turmoil of the average Ukrainian citizen during the 
communist times.  
Recent Economic Developments 
 It has taken the country a number of years since the economic collapse, equivalent to 
almost two presidential mandates, until the republic was to establish a more effective pro-reform 
administration. The table on the next page exhibits some of the key economic factors that 
illustrate the economic direction of the country since 1998. Nevertheless, other resources and 
organizations tend to have some higher positive fluctuations in the economic variables compared 
to the ones listed in the table on the next page. For safety reasons, statistical reports according to 
the Business Information Systems of the Newly Independent States (BISNIS) were chosen that 
show one of the more conservative statistical in the table on the next page (10). 
 
 
10 Vorobyov, Andriy. BISNIS Representative in Ukraine 
21 Heenan and Lamontagne. The Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States: p82-3: table 6.2, 6.4 
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Economy 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
(est.) 
A. GDP ($ billion) 30.55 30.67 32.56 37.61 39.15 
B. GDP Growth Rate -1.9% -0.4% 5.8% 9.1% 4.1% 
C. GDP Per Capita ($) 604.1 612.4 656.0 720.6 808.6 
D. Inflation 20% 22.0% 25.8% 6.1% 5.5% 
E. Unemployment (official)* 3.7% 4.3% 4.2% 3.75% 3.8% 
F. International Reserves  
($ billion) 
0.680 1.16 1.539 3.095 3.405 
G. Average Exchange Rate 
(1 USD) 
2.45 4.13 5.44 5.37 5.38 
H. Gross External Debt  
($ billion) 
11.45 10.33 8.12 7.98 7.80 
I. Industrial Output 
 (% change) 
-1.0 4.0 12.4 18.8 6.00 
 The country has been slowly pulling itself out from the huge deficit that peaked in 1994. 
Furthermore, after the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, Ukrainian officials became even more 
conscious of their responsibility and need for a change in the face of a new more effective reform. 
The political and promising administration increased to a degree the confidence among foreign 
and local investors. Those are some of the main factors that increased the value of exports and 
domestic consumer spending through the multiplier effect.   
 These government actions successfully brought the economy to a growth in its GDP for 
the first time in the year of 2000 (5.8 % +) since its independence. Nevertheless, the official 
growth rate of the GDP is expected to slow down in 2002 to 4.1% and consequently industrial 
output to 6.0% increase compared to 18.8% in 2001 (10).  This slowdown is mostly due to the 
Bush’s Administration embargo on the imports of steel. The embargo will significantly hurt 
Ukraine’s level of exports as the USA used to be Ukraine’s main export destination partner of the 
country’s popular steel industry (11).  
 As seen in the table on the previous page, the country’s international reserves have been 
steadily increasing since 1998 and are expected to peak in 2002 at $3.405 billion. In 2001, 
10 Vorobyov, Andriy. BISNIS Representative in Ukraine 
11 Yastreb, Andriy. Personal Interview 
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inflation rates have reached their lowest rate in seven years at 6.1% compared to the country’s 
double digit inflation rates in the few years before.  In 2002, inflation rates are estimated to 
further decrease to 5.5% (10) I believe that one of the reasons for maintaining the low rates of 
inflation is due to the effective monetary policy that the government has currently exercised that 
will be discussed further in detail in section under Monetary Policy. 
 The average exchange rate has been stabilized as well in the range of 5.37-5.44 hryvnya 
for 1USD since 2000. The stabilization of the exchange rate in the past few years has been 
reflected with greater industrial output most likely due to the increase of demand among foreign 
businesses to import from Ukraine (i.e. higher Ukrainian exports) (10).  
 The table on the previous pages also shows that the unemployment rates have been stable 
and low since 1998 in the range of 3.7% to 4.3% (10%). However, it is important to point out that 
those are the official unemployment levels. In general, the majority of unemployed people do not 
necessarily report to the government that they are unemployed, since they do not have any 
significant benefits to do so or fines, if they do not (11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 Vorobyov, Andriy. BISNIS Representative in Ukraine 
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Monetary Policy 
 Below are the discount interest rates of Ukraine for the period of 1992-2002. The 
introduction of the Ukrainian constitution in 1996 stabilized the interest rates and correspondingly 
the money supply. The national bank’s activity in its monetary policy was considerable. It 
intervened 56 times for the 10 year period to adjust the country’s interest rates. During the 
hyperinflation period, interest rates peaked 300% on November 25, 1994 (28). 
Ukraine National Bank Discount Interest Rates 
(1992-2002)
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 Correspondingly, the growth of the M1 has been stabilized to the range of 36% to 47% 
for the period of 1999-2002 compared to the transition period (1991-1992) when they ranged in 
the over a thousand percent increase in every single year (see table on the next page) (29).  
28 National Bank of Ukraine: Discount Rate by the Ukraine National Bank 
29 National Bank of Ukraine: Money Supply 1991-2003 
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Money supply 
1991-2001  
UAH million, end of period 
Period M0 Growth rate in % M1 
Growth 
rate in % M2 
Growth 
rate in % M3** 
Growth 
rate in %
 1991*  0.3  - 1.7 - 2.4 - - - 
1992  5 1667 21 1221 25 1050 - - 
1993  128 2560 334 1629 482 1928 - - 
1994  793 620 1860 544 3216 667 - - 
1995  2623 331 4682 252 6846 213 6930 - 
1996  4041 154 6315 135 9023 132 9364 135 
1997  6132 152 9050 143 12448 138 12541 134 
1998  7158 117 10331 114 15432 124 15705 125 
1999  9583 134 14094 136 21714 141 22070 141 
2000  12799  134 20732 147 31387 145 32084 145 
2001 19465 152 29773 144 44997 143 43619 142 
Growth rates are estimated up to the previous period, %. 
Composition of monetary aggregates: 
М0 - currency outside banks; 
М1 = М0 + funds in current accounts in domestic currency; 
М2 = М1 + time deposits in domestic currency, currency funds.  
М3 = М2 + clients' funds on trust bank transactions and securities of own liabilities. 
 While the growth of the M3 is considerably high (42% in 2001), the consumer price 
levels (inflation of 6.1% in 2001) and growth in output (GDP growth of 9.1%) have been much 
lower. 
 The graph on the next page also exhibits the deferential in inflation levels and money 
supply for the period of 1997-2001 (30). 
29 National Bank of Ukraine: Money Supply 1991-2003 
30 Ovcharenko, Ed.: International Center for Policy Studies Newsletter 
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  The reason for the trend exhibited in the graph above is mainly due to re-monetization of 
the currency as well as probable understatement of some of the officially reported inflation and 
GDP growth levels. Maintaining the official inflation and GDP growth levels at low level 
compared to the substantially high levels in the money supply can be explained by the following 
factors: 
- Administrative regulation of prices for specific services (especially utility services) 
have kept inflation levels low while maintaining stable levels of demand 
- International prices of basic goods such as fuel have gone down in 2001-2002 period 
that have slowed down the increase in consumer products in the country  
- The stable exchange levels have led to a lower demand of foreign currency and many 
people have exchanged their foreign money deposits (accumulated during the 
hyperinflation) into the national currency (i.e. high money supply). There is an 
evident trend of de-dollarisation of bank credits and deposits. For example during 
2001-2, the Ukrainian population sold 188.5 million more US dollars than it 
purchased (30). 
- Official GDP growth levels are understated since many transactions take place in the 
black market 
 
30 Ovcharenko, Ed.: International Center for Policy Studies Newsletter 
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 Developments in the year 2002 are promising as well. Annual discount interest rates have 
been going down in the year 2002 from 12.5% in January, 2002 to 10.1% in September, 2002. 
This can be seen in the table on the next page (23). 
National Bank of Ukraine 2002 (annual %) 
 Period Discount rate  established by NBU 
January 12.5 
February 12.5 
March 11.8 
from 11.03 11.5 
1 quarter 12.3 
2nd quarter 10.0 
3nd quarter 8.1 
9 months 10.1 
*The discount rate established by the NBU is calculated as average weighted in case of 
its changes during a month, the discount rate of the NBU is given for reference. 
 Correspondingly to the changes in the discount rates, the total interest rates that private 
banks charge to borrowers have decreased from 23.0% in January, 2002 to 20.0% in September, 
2002 (-3.0%), as seen in the table below. However, interestingly enough the decrease of the 
interest rates for credits in the domestic currency is far greater than the total credits decrease 
(6.2% decrease compared to 3.0%). This is mostly due to the increase (+1.1%) of interest for 
credits in foreign currency that has slowed down the actual total decrease in interest rates (23). 
Also, in the table on the next page, it can be seen that there is huge spread between the credit and 
deposit rates of domestic currency compared to the spread of foreign currency (i.e. USD) (24).  
This shows the divergence of confidence between the Ukrainian currency (UAH) and the 
stronger and stable US dollar among the general public and investors.  
 
23 National Bank of Ukraine: Interest rates of refunding banks by the NBU 2002 
24 National Bank of Ukraine: Interest rates of banks on credits and  deposits 2002 
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Also, the significant spread reflects the lower amount of risk for the banks of borrowing 
and/or lending foreign currency as compared to the local currency (24).  
Interest rates of Ukrainian banks on credits and deposits  
2002 (annual %) 
Total In domestic currency 
In foreign 
currency Period 
Credits Deposits Credits Deposits Credits Deposits 
January  23.0 9.5 29.7 10.1 10.8 7.4 
February 24.3 8.7 29.4 9.2 11.9 6.5 
March 22.4 8.2 27.6 8.6 11.9 6.7 
April 22.0 7.6 27.1 8.1 12.3 6.1 
May 22.1 7.5 26.1 7.8 12.8 6.2 
June 21.6 7.8 25.0 8.2 12.9 6.4 
July 20.2 7.3 24.9 7.9 11.8 5.8 
August 20.5 7.1 24.0 7.6 12.0 5.7 
September 20.0 7.0 23.5 7.6 11.9 5.5 
 Moreover, the decrease in interest rates of Ukrainian banks has lead to a greater demand 
among borrowers to borrow money from the banks. Therefore, the increase in lending has lead to 
an increase in the majority of dimensions of money supply (i.e. MO, M1, M2, and M3) through 
the multiplier effect that can be witnessed in the table on the next page (25).  
 
 
 
 
 
24 National Bank of Ukraine: Interest rates of banks on credits and  deposits 2002 
25 National Bank of Ukraine: Money Supply 2002 
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Money Supply 2002  
UAH million, end of period 
Period М0 Growth rates in % М1 
Growth
rates % М2 
Growth
rates % М3 
Growth
rates % 
January 18101 (93) 27586 (93) 43070 (96) 43619 (96) 
February 18666 103 28416 103 44507 103 45032 103 
March 19646 105 30287 107 46793 105 47345 105 
April 20980 107 30672 101 47844 102 48389 102 
May 20394 (97) 30670 100 48344 101 48813 101 
June 21441 105 32494 106 50772 105 51195 105 
July 22561 105 34037 105 53393 105 53913 105 
August 23568 104 35367 104 55824 105 56294 104 
September 23655 100 36504 103 57283 103 57729 103 
Growth rates are estimated up to the previous period, %. 
Composition of monetary aggregates:  
М0 - currency outside banks; 
М1 = М0 + funds in current accounts in domestic currency; 
М2 = М1 + time deposits in domestic currency and currency savings; 
М3 = М2 + client trust funds from banks fiduciary transactions and securities of own 
liabilities. 
 The table above shows stable overall growth rates ranging between 1% and 7% of the 
money supply for the first 9 months of the year 2002 among the various aggregates of interpreting 
money supply.  Only during January and May there was a temporary decrease in the money 
supply in the range of -%1 to 7% considering all of the monetary aggregates (25). 
 Considering all of the monetary policy factors discussed so far, it can be said that for the 
past 9 months the Ukrainian government has effectively managed to control the money supply 
and keep stable growth rates of its money supply. Therefore, recently the Ukrainian monetary 
policy has been in an excellent condition.  
 
 
25 National Bank of Ukraine: Money Supply 2002 
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Fiscal Policy 
 The performance of the fiscal policy for the period between January and October 2002, as 
shown on the graph below, is in good shape compared to the previous two years (graphs). In 
2002, there is a surplus in the state budget as share of the GDP as revenues exceed state 
expenditures in every single month of that year up until October 2002. This is illustrated by the 
bars in the third graph below that are all in positive (surplus) direction as well as the revenue 
dotted line that is above the expenditures solid line in every single month (22).  Therefore, the 
government should have enough excess resources to fund money for any statewide emergency 
needs of the Ukrainian citizens and the country’s infrastructure.  
January-October 2002 Budget Execution Report 
 
22 Fiscal Analysis Office Website 
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 The state’s budgetary surplus in the previous graph is further supported by the real 
percentage changes (including inflation) in the breakdown of the total revenues in the table 
above. There was considerable increase in total revenues (+17.5% - real percentage) between Jan-
Oct 2002 and Jan-Oct 2002 mainly contributed to higher tax revenues of value added tax 
(+31.0%), personal income(+24.6%), and excise taxes (+51.1%) listed in the table above. 
Furthermore, there was a real 21.2% increase in import duty revenues (22). The increase in 
import duty revenues is likely to be mainly contributed due to the 28.4% estimated increase 
($15,775m to $22,046) in the value of total imports in 2002 compared to the year 2001 (see table 
under Trade Balances) (10).   
 Several reforms were introduced to lower taxes for opening up and operating new 
entrepreneurship ventures (11). That can be partially explained by the insignificant increase of 
real 4.2% in the enterprise profit tax revenues, compared to relevant significant increases of the 
other tax revenues (22).  
 Despite of all the above, many Ukrainian economists speculate that the real GDP is in 
shadow as much as 40 to 50%, meaning that the actual GDP of the country is about 40% to 50% 
10 Vorobyov, Andriy. BISNIS Representative in Ukraine 
11 Yastreb, Andriy. Personal Interview 
22 Fiscal Analysis Office Website 
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higher then the official GDP reported on the economic factors table on the previous pages (11). 
This is a very significant fluctuation, if the speculation is true. The variance between the official 
and unofficial GDP is because of the past faulty structure of the fiscal policy that has complicated 
and ineffective tax system laws that are further explored by Pandi Kondi in the second part of this 
paper. Simply, many businesses hide their cash revenues by producing undervalued billings to 
other business partners and customers to lower the taxes that they pay to the Ukrainian 
government.  This tends to under valuate the official GDP levels that are likely to be in much 
higher levels than reported, if all business were to report the full amount of their taxable incomes 
(11).  
 However, this year’s (2002) total increase in tax revenues of real 17.5% may be 
accounted to a better fiscal policy and collection of taxes from citizens and businesses. Thus, this 
will downsize the shadow economy (uncollected taxes and lower GDP) of the country that in the 
past has been speculated to be very high (40-50%) (22). 
Trade Balances 
TRADE 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002(est.)
A. Total Exports ($ million) 12,637 11,581 14,572 16,265 22,322 
B. Total Imports ($ million) 14,675 11,846 13,956 15,775 22,046 
C. Trade Balance (Ukr) ($ 
million) 
-2,038 -265 616 490 276 
D. U.S. Exports ($ million) 368 204 725.3 569.2 N/A 
E. U.S. Imports ($ million) 531 518 360.3 457.7 N/A 
F. Trade Balance (US) ($ 
million) 
-163 -314 365 111.5 N/A 
 
 Previously reported increase in the domestic output and foreign investor confidence level 
after 1999 led to a significant increase in exports in 2000 ($14,572 million) and total surplus of 
$616 million  in the same year, as seen on the table above.  However, there has been a slowdown 
in the 2001 surplus due to a significant decrease of about 21.5% (down to $569.2m from $725.3m 
in 2000) of Ukrainians exports to the US. Also, Ukraine’s imports from the US hiked by 27% 
11 Yastreb, Andriy. Personal Interview 
22 Fiscal Analysis Office Website 
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($360.3m to $457.7m in 2001) further contributing to the decrease of the surplus (10). This was 
mainly due to an increase in the export duties in the agricultural industry that discouraged the 
export levels of Ukraine (13).   
Foreign Direct Investments 
 As discussed in the economic conditions analysis section above, foreign direct 
investments prove to be an essential driving force in determining the economic developments of 
the country. The Ukrainian State Statistics Committee reported that for the period of 1992 to 
April 1, 2002 the total value of foreign direct investments into Ukraine is approximately $4.532 
billion. Disbursed over the years, we can see from the table below that the high investments levels 
in the last several years have made sound contributions to their total value of $4.532 billion. Also, 
it can be seen that the investment levels have been increasing since 1999 and are expected to peak 
at the $700m level in 2002. Those levels of investments were contributed by a total of 7,794 state 
and private business organizations. 
Total Foreign Direct 
Investment 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (est.)
  $747m $471m $ 593m $531m $700m 
 
  The capital city, Kyiv, has been the most attractive international investor’s destination 
with a total of $1, 209.1m and accordingly the Kyiv region ($340.8m) and the Donetsk region 
($305.3m) (10).  The Donetsk region was the first experimental free economic zone introduced in 
Ukraine to attract foreign investors that later resulted in its significant foreign investments in that 
region. Moreover, the foreign direct investment market has responded positively to Ukraine 
following favorable changes in the country’s Law of Investment Activity of 1992 and Foreign 
Investment Law of 1996. The changes in the fiscal policy eliminated several tax breaks 
previously assigned to foreign investors as well as tried to balance out more effectively the tax 
 10 Vorobyov, Andriy. BISNIS Representative in Ukraine   
  
  
13 Economic Research Service Website 
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load between foreign and domestic investors, increasing the foreign investors market competition 
with domestic investors.  
 The U.S.-Ukraine Trade Agreement (1992) reproduced an agreement between the two 
countries as the Most Favored Nations Status. Consequently, reports of April 1, 2002 show that 
the US is the leading US source of foreign direct investment in Ukraine with $763.3m (16.8%); 
followed by Cyprus $485m (10.7%); Great Britain $426.3m (9.4%); Netherlands, $383.8m 
(8.5%); and Russia, $317.7m (7.0%) (10). Ironically enough, many Ukrainian economists 
speculate that the considerable foreign direct investments of the midget economy of Cyprus are 
primarily fueled by money laundering of the elite of the Ukraine’s government officials  who 
accumulated huge earnings in the chaos of the 1993 Ukrainian economic crisis. Nowadays, those 
considerable illegal earnings are believed to be added back into the Ukrainian economy through 
‘foreign’ direct investments from some the Ukrainian individuals’ funds that for example were 
deposited   in Cyprus banks and/or invested in businesses their at one point of time (11). 
 As of the April 2002 statistics, the top four sectors for foreign investments are the food 
industry, $806.7m (17.8%); domestic wholesale/retail trade, $675.3m (14.9%); financial services, 
$376.2m (8.3%), and machine building, $344.4m (7.6%).   
 Some of the major foreign investors in Ukraine that can be potential competitors to 
MASCO in the construction industry include American Industrial Development Corporation 
(AIDCO), Best International (USA), Interwindows (USA), OTIS (USA), Western NIS Enterprise 
Fund, Knauff (Germany), Henkel Bautechnik (Germany), and JOBI (Austria) (10). The 
internationally competitive business marketplace in the construction and building materials 
industry is analyzed in further detail in the second part of the paper.  
 
 
10 Vorobyov, Andriy. BISNIS Representative in Ukraine 
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Conclusions  
 
 
 
 
 The country has gone through a very difficult period of transition shifting from a bitter 
traditional state controlled system to a new fragile market system. The Ukrainian involvement in 
the CIS has further postponed the disintegration of the Soviet economy, but it was crucial into 
transforming the dependent planned economies into less dependent market economies. One of the 
tests that the country had to undergo was the hyperinflation that ruined the purchasing power of 
the people leaving many into disparity.  
 It is obvious to me personally that there are still various considerable weaknesses in the 
political systems that prevented the economy of advancing in the expected rate following 
Ukrainian’s independence. Some of those include the Socialist mindset of the majority of 
legislators, high corruption levels, and a number of political figures that undermine the market 
economy orientated goals of President Kuchma. In addition, President’s Kuchma murder 
accusation scandal has added more unrest and weakening of the presidential legislative support 
and confidence among foreign investors. Nevertheless, there has been considerable involvement 
between the US and Ukraine in efforts of providing greater opportunities and better economic 
environment for foreign investors. Also, the shift in the balance of power in the parliament in 
2002 might be just enough to create a better cooperation among the executive and legislative 
branches or lead to another fiasco in the political system that has been going for some time now.  
 Following a lengthily depression of the Ukrainian economy up until 1998, recent 
recovery following 1998 has exceeded many of the economists’ expectations, putting back the 
economy back on the road towards growth. Even that foreign direct investment have been 
increasing over the last couple of years, the growth rate has been far short from the potential and 
size of the Ukrainian economy. As a result, generally speaking foreign direct investment levels 
and confidence still remain unstable due to still existing unfavorable gaps in the tax system, 
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political corruption, and weak corporate legal framework. Despite all the obstacles above, US 
investors have continued their commitment to Ukraine, which is evident by highest share of 
foreign direct investment in Ukraine that the US currently maintains compared to other countries. 
The involvement of the US and other foreign investors in Ukraine has helped them to learn how 
to operate in the most beneficial economic means in distinctive and currently deficient political 
and economic systems for international trade.  
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